Aided by strong economic growth the Singapore government has been able to keep both the tax rate and the government expenditure rate low and yet generate healthy budget surpluses year after year. Although the gap between the tax rate and the government expenditure rate is the obvious source of the surplus, this paper shows the presence of another subtle source, a surplus generated by conservative growth forecasts that lay the base for revenue projections. An omitted variable bias in a model based on the tax smoothing hypothesis led us to consider the role played by the growth forecast error in predicting the budget surplus. Our computations show that on average the underprediction of the tax base (GDP) must have contributed about $376 million per year to the realized budget surplus over the period 1990-2005. This appears to be simply a byproduct of the Government's philosophy of "fiscal prudence".
Introduction
The public sector has played a pivotal role in the economic and social progress of Singapore. Nevertheless, the Keynesian advocacy of deficit financing had no role in Singapore's fiscal policy operations. Instead, perhaps driven by Confucian ethics of thrift and frugality, the Singapore government has stayed lean relative to the size of the economy 1 and managed to secure healthy budget surpluses in many good years. These surpluses have yielded a robust fiscal position for Singapore with total public assets standing at $437 billion by the end of March 2005. 2 In recent years, however, the budget balance has not been that favourable due to volatile economic conditions, lowered income and corporate tax rates and the emergence of new spending priorities (Budget Speech, 2006) . The introduction of "special transfer"
programs has especially added to the reduction of the surplus. For example, the planned $3.59 billion "Progress Package" that included growth dividends, workfare bonuses, national service bonuses and CPF top-ups led to a projected $2.86 billion deficit in 2006.
Without the Progress Package the projected budget balance was a surplus of $ 0.73 billion.
Analysts, however, have drawn a distinction between the reported budget balance and the actual budget balance. The difference arises from a conservative accounting method that the government has adopted on the revenue side of the budget (Asher, 2002 (Asher, , 2003 . Two major items are excluded from the budget. One is receipts from the sale of land and other capital goods. The volatile nature of these receipts is the reason for not considering them 1 In Singapore, government consumption and investment expenditures have constituted about 10 and 4 percent of GDP respectively over 1990-2005. Over the same period the percentage of government consumption spending alone was 20 in Canada, 20 in the U.K., 16 in Japan, and 16 in the U.S. 3 as a regular revenue component. The other item is the net investment income (NII) 3 generated by investing government reserves. As a constitutional requirement only up to 50% of the NII can be included in current revenues and the rest has to be protected as past reserves. The contention is that these are government revenue items and be part of the budget account. As reported in the local news papers they would turn the apparent deficit in 2006 into a handsome surplus.
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The objective of this exercise is not to dwell so much in the accounting methods but to bring out a less known source of the budget surplus, a surplus attributable to conservative growth forecasts that the government has adopted in making the budget projections. Since budget estimates are based on a predicted GDP growth rate any systematic forecast error in the growth rate should be reflected in the realized budget balance. We try to quantify this relationship and assess the amount of the budget surplus that can be attributed to conservative growth forecasts. Since there is no theoretical basis for such a relationship our exercise is essentially an attempt to establish a missing link in a regression model on tax smoothing.
Methodology
We adopt Barro's (1979 Barro's ( , 1981 Barro's ( , 1986 Barro's (1986) formulation to examine the response of primary budget surplus to debt-income ratio. Studies such as Huang and Lin (1993) , Ghosh (1995) , Olekalns (1997) , Serletis and Schorn (1999) , Cashin et al. (2002) , Kula (2004) and Fisher and Kingston (2005) examine whether the fiscal deficit is informative of future changes in government expenditures.
It would be instructive to begin with Barro's (1986) basic formulation and then move on to formulate a regression model. Here we present the model in discrete time units instead of the mixed continuous-discrete time frame that Barro adopted. From the one period budget constraint, the present value of the government borrowing constraint can be written as:
where τ is the average tax rate,
Assuming that Y and G grow at the same rate (μ) in the long-run, the trend values of Y and G can be written as 
Plugging these into (2) we obtain:
The overall government budget surplus at time t can be written as
where the first right-hand term represents the projected tax revenue and the second term is the change in the tax revenue resulting from the income forecast error. Plugging (3) into (4) and rearranging the terms we obtain:
where 1
represents the trend government expenditure rate including interest payments net of the growth effect. In (5) we allow for the possibility 2 1 γ γ τ = + such that it can be expressed in a regression format as follows:
In (6) 1 1 0 β γ = > should estimate the average government expenditure rate. Obviously the trend government expenditure rate should be approximately constant for the formulation in (6) to be meaningful. 7 We also expect 2 1 β = − and 3 0 β < ; the magnitude of the latter provides an estimate of the long run growth rate. Having controlled for these effects, 4 0 β > captures the effect of output forecast errors on the surplus.
Model (6) embodies very explicit theoretical implications which can easily be tested. If income forecasts are correct or the forecast errors are purely random then (6) reduces to
If we try to test the tax smoothing hypothesis within the Singapore context by testing its implications embodied in (7) we would be led to rejecting the hypothesis. This prompted us to suspect the presence of an omitted variable bias in the regression coefficients and to consider growth forecast errors as the possible missing variable from the model. This was the basis for the formulation in (6).
Data Sources
The sample period of this study runs from 1990 to 2005. We limit our study to this period because data on growth forecasts are traceable only back to 1990. Actual and projected data for government revenue and its components, government expenditure and its 
Accounting Method and Budget Surplus
It would be useful to estimate the model in (6) using both the reported budget surplus and adjusted surpluses since Singapore's budgetary account system is not very similar to the standard IMF system (Asher, 2002 (Asher, , 2003 . In Singapore's budget accounts, government revenue consists of tax revenue, fees and charges, net investment income ( Development expenditures are spending on direct development projects, capital grants and other capital injections.
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As stated earlier the reported budget surplus does not include the full amount of the net investment income and omits the receipts from the sales of lands and other capital goods.
These two items are the most volatile revenue components. The coefficient of variation of the growth rates of investment and interest income and capital receipts over our sample period was 30% and 41% respectively as opposed to only 2.4% for income tax revenues.
It is therefore prudent not to consider them as regular revenue streams in setting the expenditure targets. However, their realized amounts could be made available for budgetary purposes. Since the government is considering a constitutional change for this purpose, it would be useful to examine government's financial position with and without these items.
We consider two possible adjusted surpluses. One is where the full amount of capital receipts is made available as a revenue item with no change to the NII contribution rule.
The second is where the full amounts of both capital receipts and NII are made available to the budget. Since the data on total NII is not available, we use investment and interest income net of interest payment on government debt as a proxy for NII. We have to caution the reader that this proxy may over-estimate the NII by a fare margin. The computations for 2005 are shown in Table 1 GDP respectively. Based on these figures one could go to the extreme and recommend using up capital receipts and NII fully for budgetary purposes. However, the government's dilemma would be how to strike a balance between strengthening and protecting the country's reserve position and maintaining a healthy budget balance. 
Forecast Error and Budget Surplus
To estimate the model in (6) and 1997 even the upper bounds of the government growth forecasts were mostly below the observed growth rates. These conservative forecasts have under-predicted GDP by $2.1 billion on average per year. The picture changes when the economy entered the turbulent period after 1997. Obviously forecasting is far more difficult during turbulent periods compared to steadily trending periods. Even then the average forecast error was a positive $1.1 billion. Over the whole period the forecast error was about $1.6 billion per year. In other words, the actual tax base was higher by about $1.6 billion per year compared to the projected one. Notes: Forecast GDP growth rate is from the annual Budget Speech. Forecast error is computed using the average of lower and upper bound projections. Table 3 growth rate of about 6.5 percent observed over the sample period. Unless one suspects an omitted variable bias, the first two estimates would be taken as evidence against the tax smoothing model. As we correctly suspected, however, adding the forecast error into the regression brings these estimates very close to their expected values and remain robust regardless of the type of forecast error used in the regression.
Before discussing the results further it would be worthwhile to draw attention to Figure 2 which plots the recursive estimates of the coefficients of Model 4 in Table 3 . As we can see these estimates settle down to constants remarkably well. The diagnostics reported in Table 3 are also highly satisfactory. The regressions 2-4 in Table 3 explain about 93
percent of the variation of the reported budget surplus and the fitted values track the turning points of the surplus series very closely (the graph is omitted for brevity).
The similarity of the regression estimates of Models 2-4 in Table 3 is remarkable. The statistical significance of the forecast error coefficient clearly indicates the presence of systematic forecast errors. After controlling for the output gap, expenditure gap and public debt, the GDP forecast error can explain about 13 percent of the variation of the budget surplus. Although the estimated coefficient of 0.24 is slightly above the average tax rate of 0.2 observed over the sample period, it captures some data regularities that are not captured by the other coefficients. It indicates that a $1 change in the forecast error has contributed 24 cents on average to the surplus. This translates to about $376 million surplus per year that is attributable to about $1.6 billion under-prediction of the GDP.
Replicating the above exercise with the adjusted budget surpluses proved less promising.
This is a result of the high volatility of capital receipts and investment and interest income that are less correlated with the predictor variables in the model. (6) 
